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W.H. Bryson

SOME OLD PROBLEMS IN ENGLAND AND SOME NEW SOLUTIONS FROM
VIRGINIA

1

Introduction

The fundamental ideal to which we aspire in the field of civil procedure is the perfect balance between expeditious results and correct results in the administration of
justice. Two famous quotations from two famous English Equity judges come to
mind. John Scott, Lord Eldon, the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain from 1801 to
1827/ who was often criticized for being excessively dilatory, said,2 'sat cito si sat
bene'. 3 Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls from 1873 to 1883,4 once said, 'I may be
wrong and sometimes am, but I never have any doubts'. 5 Jessel had his docket under firm control, and he moved the cases before him to speedy conclusions to the
general satisfaction of all concerned. Where the stakes are affordable, most clients
prefer to have a quick resolution to their problems so that they can move on with
thell· lives and affairs. Lawyers are more willing to wait a reasonable amount of
time if the judge will carefully consider the reasons for his decision and publish a
learned opinion which will be useful as a precedent for the future.
This problem is one truly worthy of serious study. Although the solution is
beyond the wisdom and experience of this writer, I would like to offer a few
thoughts for the benefit, Deo volente, of others. Part One of this essay points out one

R.A. Mclikan, John Scott, Lord Eldon, 1751-1838, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1999, especially chapter 16; H. Twiss, T11e Public mid Private Life of Lord Chancellor Eldon, 2nd
edition, London, Murray, 1844.
11\!oolley v. Maidment (House of Lords 1818), 6 Dow 257, at 276, 3 English Reports 1464, at 1470.
'It satisfies quickly if it satisfies well'. Eldon was quoting Baron Shute in Attorney General v.
King (Exchequer 1582), Savile 22, 123 English Reports 990, who was paraphrasing Caesar Augustus, who said 'Sat celeriter fieri quidquid fiat satis bene'. Suetonius, Lives of tlie Twelve Caesars, chapter 2, section 25.
W.D.I. Foulkes, A Generation of Judges, London, Sampson, 1886, p. 171-182; G.R. Rubin, 'Jessel,
Sir George', in A.W.B. Simpson (ed.), Biograpf1icnl Dictionary of the Co111111011 L11w, London, Butterworth's, 1984, p. 280-282.
Dictionary ofNati01111l Biogr11phy, volu1ne 10, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1922, p. 805-807.
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of the problems of the past. Part Two addresses methods of solution from the past.
Part Three gives a suggestion for the future.

2

Sinecures: something to be avoided

In England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many public offices in the
English Government had become sinecures, including many of the clerical officers
of the courts of law. The holders were paid nominal salaries, if any at all, that had
been fixed in the middle ages, but they supported themselves by fees that were, by
ancient tradition, attached to the various services that they rendered. They held a
life estate in their positions and had the right to exercise the office through a deputy.
The problems were made greater by the custom of granting the offices ll1 reversion, 6
so that the rights to them were often vested well into the future. As time went by,
these fees became very lucrative, so that the holder of the office could easily find a
deputy to do the work for a modest salary or for a percentage of the fees and have a
substantial amount of money left for himself. These sinecures were a means of rewarding faithful service to the King or to a high officer in the Government; they
were equivalent to pensions.
'
Court clerks were put into office by patents, grants, and ceremonies similar to
livery of seisin. In fact, their offices were incorporeal real property rights that were
protected by the forms of action associated with real property.7 Thus, in the early
nineteenth century, when the British Government began to rationalize its bureaucracy, including that of the law courts, it was necessary to begin by waiting for office holders to die or by purchasing these vested rights.s
One notable example of this was the office of the King's Remembrancer in the
Court of Exchequer. 9 The office of King's Remembrancer dates back to the middle
ages; this officer was one of the senior clerks in the Exchequer, performing important clerical functions that were necessary for the procedure of the Court of Exchequer. The more important of the King's Remembrancer's duties were quasi-judicial. It
was to him that all references in suits in Equity were sent. 10 He settled disputes in
the pleadings involving scandal and impertinence. Also he kept all moneys paid
into court,11 took accounts, examined certain witnesses, and kept exhibits and docu-

'"
''
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A reversion was a grant of son1ething which was to begin upon the happening of a future event,
-usually the death of the present owner.
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on t!Je Laws of E11gla11d, volume 2, Oxford, darendon, 1766, p. 36;
e.g., Webb's Case (1608), 8 Coke Reports 45, 77 English Reports 541; Vaux v. feffereu (1556), 2
Dyer 114, 73 English Reports 251; Case 56, Jenkins 126, 145 English Reports 89; Bagot v. Tve
(1469), Year Book T1inity 9 Edward IV,£. 6, placitun1 2; Garter King of Anus Case (1466), Year
Book I-Iilary 5 Edward IV,£. Sb, placitum 1.
E.g., Statutes 25 George III [1785], chapter 52; Statutes 57 George III [1817], chapter 60; Statutes 2 & 3 William IV [1832}, chapters 110, 111.
See generally, W.lf. Bryson, Tl1e EquihJ Side of flze Excl1equer, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 65-74, 186-191; G.A. Bonner, Tlte Office of tl1e King's Remembrancer in England, London, Butterworth's, 1930.
Rule 57, Ordi11es Cm1cellariae, London, Atkins, 1698, p. 55.
House of Commons, Session Papers 1810-11(number246), volume 3, p. 961 et seq. (p. 979-981).
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inents brought into court. He attended the sittings of the court and took the minutes
of the decrees and orders. 12
Every time the King's Remembrancer did anythiI1g officially, he was entitled
to receive a fee from the litigatil1g party who needed this service. By the seventeenth
century, the legal business of the Exchequer had increased to such a point that the
office of King's Remembrancer was extremely lucrative. It was indeed sufficiently
valuable so as to be a major source of income to support a noble family, the Fanshawes, who had made their way iI1to the nobility by means of their connection to
the Exchequer.
The office of the I<ing' s Remembrancer, even though it was by custom only
granted for life, was kept in the Fanshawe family from 1565 until 1716, when the
eldest branch died out. The first of the 'dynasty' was Henry Fanshawe (d. 1568),
v.1ho began as a sworn clerk in the Queen's Remembrancer's Office and an Undercharnberlain of the Exchequer. 13 On 12 December 1561, he managed to acquire a
patent for the reversion to the office of Queen's Remen1brancer upon the surrender
14
of the same reversion, which had been previously granted to Francis Allen. He, no
doubt, had bought out Allen's interest. Henry Fanshawe succeeded to the office according to his patent in 1565 when Thomas Saunder died. On 10 February 1567,
15
Bernard Hampton was given the reversion to the office after Henry Fanshawe.
Henry Fanshawe had no sons, but his nephew, Thomas Fanshawe (d. 1601),
lived with him in Warwick Lane in London and was one of the sworn clerks in his
office. Henry Fanshawe on 5 July 1568, only a few months before his death, bought
16
out Hampton's interest in his office and got the reversion for Thomas. On 28 October 1568, Henry died and Thomas succeeded to the office of Queen's Remembrancer. Tho1nas Fanshayve was ai1 active and competent man; it was he who really
founded the fortunes of the family. Moreover, he was in office duri11g the formative
period of the Equity jurisdiction and was probably the mai1 most responsible for
settling the clerical procedures of the offices and for the beginning of the preservation of the court records. He is frequently mentioned in the law reports as having
given advice to the court. 17 He was a member of the Middle Temple and a member
of Parliament in 1572, 1584, 1588, 1593, and 1597." Thomas Fanshawe's first wife,
Mary Bourchier (d. 1578), whom he married sometime between 1566 and 1569, was
House of Commons, Session Papers 1822 (number 125), volu1ne 11, p. 99 el seq. (p. 113-114};
Compleat Clerk ill Court, London, Lacy, 1726, p. 151; Rule 30, Ordi11es Cancellariae, supra. note 10,
n

p. 31.
All of the genealogical information in this section coo.1es from H.C. Fanshawe, The I.-J.istory of
lite Fanshawe Family, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Reid, 1927; see also Dictionary of National Biography, volume 6, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1922, p. 1047-1054.
Calendar of Patent Rolls [1560-63], p. 304.
Calendar of Patent Rolls [1566-69], p. 65, nwnber 462.
Calendar of Patent Rolls [1566-69], p. 318, nun1ber 1864.
E.g., Case 36, Savile 14, 123 English Reports 992 (Exchequer 1582); Puckering v. Fis/1er, Savile
29, 123 English Reports 1005 (Exchequer "1583); Case 109, Savile 52, 123 English Reports 1007

(Exchequer 1583).
Dictionary of National Biogrnpliy, supra note 13, p. 1053; J. and J.A. Venn, A11111111i Cm1ta.brigie11ses, part 1, volume 2, Can1bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1922, p. 120.
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the niece of Sir Walter Mildmay, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Whether the Exchequer connection was the result or the cause of the marriage is unclear, but certairtly, once the com1ections had been made, Mildmay and Fanshawe must have
worked together very closely both in the Exchequer and in Parliament. 19
On 1 May 1572 the reversion of the office was granted to Christopher (later Sir
Christopher) Hatton (d. 1619). 20 Sir Christopher Hatton, the ultimate heir of his
eponymous cousin, the Lord Chancellor, soon after married Alice, one of the daughters of Thomas Fanshawe.21 Thomas died in office in 1601 having neglected or failed
to get a reversion for his son and heir, Henry (later Sir Hemy) Fanshawe (d. 1616).
However, Henry succeeded in getting a patei1t appointing him to the office within a
month of his father's death.22
On 14 July 1604 Sir Henry procured a grant of the reversion of the office to
John Fanshawe, his first cousin who was a minor clerk in the office, and to Nathaniel Duckett, a cousin and a sworn clerk. They were to hold the office after his death
in trust for his minor son Thomas Fanshawe (later first Viscount Fanshawe) (d.
1665). However, john Fanshawe died in late 1615 or early 1616 and Sir Henry followed him on 10 March 1616. 23 It was felt desirable to re-arrange the trust, and so on
21 March 1616 a grant was made to Sir Christopher Hatton with a reversion to Sir
Arthur Harris, both grants being in trust for the children of the late Sir Henry Fanshawe.2-1 Sir Arthur Harris was a first cousin of Thomas Fanshawe (d. 1665). The
ITust was necessary because an office could not be exercised by a minor.
Sir Christopher Hatton, being only the trustee of the King's Remembrancer's
office, performed his duties through a deputy, john West, who was one of the
sworn clerks. This was the begirming of the general employment of deputy King's
Remernbrancers. Hatton died on 10 September 1619; Thomas Fanshawe, the beneficiary of the trust, was then of age, and so a new grant was obtained on 22 September 1619. Ibis was to Thomas with a reversion to Harris as rrustee for the children
of Sir Henry Fanshawe (d. 1616), i.e., the heirs presumptive of Thomas. 25 Thomas
did not marry until 1627. By this time, the Fanshawes had begun to look on the office of King's Remembrancer more as a part of the family endowment than as an occupation. The deputy received a salary which was considerably less than the profits
derived from the office.
Sir Thomas Fanshawe (d. 1665) had a son, Henry, who was born in 1630 but
who lived less than four months. His second son, William, was born in 1631, and
Thomas, his eventual heir, was born in 1632. As a result of the enlargement of his

Ge11e11logic11l Memor1111da Re/ati11g to the Family of Mildmay, London, no publisher, 1871, p. 8, 12;
l-I.C. Fanshawe, History of t/Je Fanslwwe Family, supra note 13, p. 22.
Calendar of Patent Rolls [1569-72], p. 339, number 2451.
H.C. 11anshawe, History of t!Je Fnushawe Fnmily, supra note 13, p. 27, 28.
This patent did not mention Hatton's interest, nor were any reversions granted.
lI.C. Fanshawe, flistory of Ifie Fanslwwe Family, suprn note 13, p. 50-52.
The date is given as 19 March 1616 in Calendar of State Papers Domestic [1611-18], p. 355, see
also p. 357 (27 March 1616).
The date is given as 17 September 1619 in Calendar of State Papers Domestic [1619-23}, p. 78, see
also p. 82 (2 October 1619).
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family, Sir Thomas decided to re-arrange the settlement of the office. On 9July1631,
he received a new grant to himself with reversions first to his brother Simon (later
26
Sir Simon) Fanshawe (d. 1680), a sworn clerk, and then to Sir George Sands. In
1641 Sir Thomas 'sold' the office to his youngest brother, Richard Fanshawe (d.
1666), who was later created a baronet. The arrangement was that Richard should
be 111ade King's Reme1nbrancer and should account for the profits of the office to Sir
Thomas and, if he would pay Sir Thomas£ 8,000 within seven years, then he should
thereafter keep the profits for himself. 27 In accordance with this agreement a grant
was made on 5 August 1641 to Richard Fanshawe with reversions to William (later
the third baronet) Ayloffe (d. 1675) and then to Rowland Litton. William Ayloffe
was a first cousin of Sir Thomas and Richard Fanshawe. The outbreak of the Civil
War prevented Richard from paying the money to his brother. In 1644 Humphrey
Salwey was made Kll1g's Remembrancer. The loss of the office to the Fanshawes
was the result of their royalist loyalties. William Ayloffe petitioned unsuccessfnlly
in 1647 to be made King's Remembrancer on the grounds that the 'delinquency' of
Richard Fanshawe did not invalidate his reversion. 28 Salwey also seems to have had
29
son1e trouble at this time, but he managed to retain his office.
Salwey was succeeded in 1654 by Francis Burwell, and he was succeeded in
1658 by John Dodington. Dodington was not well thought of by the barons, and
they required him to find a deputy before they would admit him; two days later he
was sworn into office, but the barons declared that there were plenty of precedents
for not admitting incompetent people to public office. 30 It is interesting to note that
no reversions were granted during the period of parliamentary control and the Interregnum. It was not m1til the nineteenth century, however, that reversions to offices were legally forbidden. 31
In 1660, Parliament restored the Stuarts as Kings, and they restored the Fanshawes as King's Remembrancers. Sir Thomas Fanshawe (d. 1665) received a new
grant dated 7 August 1660, which included reversions to his son Thomas (d. 1674),
then to Vere Bertie, and then to Henry Ayloffe. 32 Henry Ayloffe was the youngest
brother of Sir William Ayloffe (d. 1675) and a cousin of the Fanshawes; he and Bertie were to hold the office as trustees for the Fanshawe family. By way of reward for
his loyalties to the Stuarts and because of his hardships under Cromwell, Sir Thomas Fanshawe was created Viscount Fanshawe in September 1661. He died in
March 1665, and his son Thomas (d. 1674) succeeded him as viscount and as King's
Remembrancer.
T. Ry1ner, Foeder11, part 3, volume 8, 3rd edition, The l-Iague, no publisher, 1743, p. 221; C11lc11-

dar ofSl11te Papers Domestic [1631-33], p. 102.
A. Fanshawe, lvfemoirs of Ann Lady Fm1slwwe, London, Lane, I--1.C. Fanshawe (ed.) 1907, p. 29,
30.
I-lislorical Manuscripts Conunission, Report, nun1ber 6, p. 209.
See H. Salwey, Lords' Journ11l, volun1e 9, p. 518; volume 10, p. 117.
Note, Hardres 130, 145 English Reports 415.
See Statutes 48 George Ill [1808], chapter 50; Statutes 50 George ill 11810}, chapter 88; Statutes

52 George lll [1812], chapter 40.

Cnle11d11r of State Papers Domestic [1660-61], p. 208.

51

So1ne Old Problems in England and Some New Solutions

In 1674, a series of rather complicated legal manoeuvres began. In that year the
second Viscount Fanshawe died having made a fairly sophisticated will providing
for his family out of, inter alia, the profits of the office of the King's Remembrancer.
Vere Bertie succeeded to the trusteeship of that office according to the patent In the
same year Lady Fanshawe sued Bertie, Ayloffe, and Henry Fanshawe as executors
of the will of the second Viscount Fanshawe or as a trustee for her jointuTe of £ 600
per annu1n payable out of the profits of the office. 33
In February 1675 Sarah Lady Fanshawe, the daughter of Sir John Evelyn and
the widow of Thomas second Viscount Fanshawe, married George fifth Viscount
Castleton. 34 Bertie resigned in June 1675 to become a Baron of the Exchequer, and
Henry Ayloffe became King's Remembrancer. Since the death of her first husband
Lady Castleton had been very active in the interests of her family; 35 she succeeded
by 25 November in having the office of the King's Remembrancer re-settled in a
very complicated way in order to provide for her rniI1or son, Evelyn, the third Viscount Fanshawe, and his he:ITs so that the profits of the office would continue to
support the dignity of the peerage. This new patent granted a series of reversions to
Henry, ChaTles, and Simon Fanshawe, the three uncles of the infant third viscount,
in trust for him and his successors to the title; thus there was a slightly different
succession provided for the legal and equitable estates in the office.
In 1675, Tobias Eden, the deputy King's Remembrancer, sued Charles Fanshawe, Sir Thomas Fanshawe, and Evelyn Viscount Fanshawe iI1 order to be reinstated as deputy,36 and he sued Bertie, the King's Remembrancer, for an accounting of money due to him out of the office. 37 In this same year, the trust in favour of
Viscount Fanshawe was decreed in the case of Evelyn Viscount Fanshatve by Sir John
Evelyn, his next friend v. Sarah Viscountess Fanshawe, Bertie, Henry Fnnshazue, Charles
Fanshatve, Sir Tho1nas Fanshazue, and Eden, 38 and the King's Remembrancer was ordered to make an account. This must have been a friendly suit for a decree to have
been made within a yeaT in such a tangled business. In 1676, there began an involved and drawn out suit over the profits of the office, the accotmts to the beneficiaries of the trust, all of which was further complicated by the minority of Viscount
Fanshawe: Evelyn Viscount Fanshatve, an infant, by Henry Fanshatve his next friend v.
Ayloffe, Eden, Sir T710111as Fanshawe, and Charles Fanshawe. 39 Connected with this suit
was Ayloffe v. George Viscount Castleton, Lady Castleton, Evelyn Viscount Fanshawe,
Henry Fanshawe, Charles Fnnshaive, Sir T7101nas Fanshawe, Eden, Atkyns, and Eyres,'w in
which Ayloffe attempted by means of a bill of interpleader to have the deputy
33

''
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See Public Record Office, London(= PRO), E.133/52/8 and E.133/52/14.
G.E.C., Complete Peerage, volume 3, p. 100; volu1ne 5, p. 256.
PRO S.P.44/46, p. 53 (10 October 1675); Cnlendnr of Treasury Books, volume 4, p. 336, 340; H.C.
Fanshawe, I-Jistory of the F1111sh11we Family, suprn note 13, p. 120.
PRO E.112/459/1193.
See PRO E.133/49/28.
PRO E.126/12, f. 141v-143v, 324, 329; E.126/13, f. 92v, 114; E.126/15, f. 306v-310;
E.133/52/13.
PRO E.112/458/1138; E.112/465/1604; E.126/13, f. 3, 37, 44v, 119, 199v, 127, 282.
PRO E.l26/13, f. 38v, 51v-53.
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King's Remembrancer account directly to the beneficiaries of the trust. Ayloffe exercised his office by a deputy, and, since he held it in. trust, he had to account to the
beneficiaries for the profits; all of this litigation must have been extremely costly,
and Ayloffe, no doubt, wanted to escape the il1evitable entanglements of such suits
in Equity, in which he had no significant interest. The result of the failure of this bill
was another suit h1 the very next year: Evelyn Viscount Fanshaive by Sa1nuel Collins his
next friend v. Aylaffe. 41 In 1687 Evelyn third Viscount Fanshawe died aged eighteen,
and the litigation seems to have come to an end in 1689 with the decree in the suit of
George Viscount Castleton and Lady Castleton v. Charles Viscount Fanshaive, Sir Tho1nas
Fanshaive, Atkyns, Ayloffe, Eyres, and Eden.42 This tedious exposition barely scratches
the surface of this mountain of litigation over the wills and estates, trusts and accounts ll.1 connection with the office of the King's Remembrancer in this fifteen-year
period. There were other additional suits involving the same issues but with different combinations of parties.43
The litigation over the family 'property' of the Fanshawes reflected the complicated dispositions an.cl settlements then in general use to perpetuate assets of
wealth, and in the devolutions of interests the inevitable occurrences of infancies
lead readily to litigation. There is no evidence that the Fanshawe family suffered
from aiUmosities; they were merely h1volved in elaborate schemes of settlement
which from time to time necessitated resort to the courts to straighten out ensuing
tangles and to cure unforeseen troubles.
Returning to the office of the King's Remembrancer in 1687, we find Evelyn
third Viscount Fanshawe dead unmarried; his oldest uncle, Henry Fanshawe, had
predeceased him in 1685 also without issue. The beneficial ll1terest in the office and
the viscountcy theref9re passed to Charles Fanshawe. In 1708, Henry Ayloffe died,
and Charles fourth Viscount Fanshawe was the 11ext reversioner in the patent.
However, Charles was a Jacobite and refused to swear the oath of allegiance to
Queen Anne. He had been one of only three to speak in favour of King James II in
Parliament in 1689 after James had fled from England, and in 1692 he had been ar44
rested for high treason and imprisoned in the Tower of London. He could not
have been admitted to the office of Queen's Remembrancer without having sworn
the oaths, and so his younger brother Simon, the next reversioner, brought a scire facias against him in Chancery for his refusal to act. Charles's reversionary rights were
suppressed for non-user, and Simon was put ll1to office. 45 A suit in the Exchequer
determined that Charles had forfeited not only his rights to exercise the office under

PRO E.112/ 465/1628; E.126/13, f. 224, 323, 328, 329.
PRO E.112/712/2061; E. 126/15, !. 306v-310.
A large number of office copies and bills of costs from these suits are now among the FinchHatton papers in the Northamptonshire Record Office.
H.C. Fanshawe, History of tl1e Fnnslwwe Fnmily, suprn note 13, p. 123; f-Iistorical Manuscripts
Commission, Report, number 71, vohune 4, p. 125, nuni.ber 236 (6May1692).
See PRO E.159/553 Michaelmas 7 Annae recorda rot. 122 in which Stevens was made custodian of the office pendente lite; the end of the litigation is recorded in PRO E.159/554, Trinity 8
Annae recorda rot. 48; Smuuel Dodd's Reports, Durhani., North Carolina, Carolina Academic
Press, 2000, p. 220.
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the patent but also his beneficial rights to the profits of the office under the trust. 46
Charles, an old bachelor, died in 1710, and Simon, also unmarried, became the fifth
and last Viscount Fanshawe. He died in 1716; the title became extinct, and the office
of King's Remembrancer went to the husband of Queen Anne's former favourite,
Abigail Hill, later Lady Masham.47
Many other examples from the various English courts of law could be given.48
Because of such sinecures in the courts, there was an incentive to increase business
in order to increase the fees, which went into private pockets. Thus, there was an incentive to delay action and to require unneeded services to be performed and, of
course, paid for. Reform of the procedures of the courts was stifled wherever possible by the clerks, and serious procedural law reforms did not take place in England
until after the sinecures had been abolished in the early nineteenth century. One of
these reforms was to have the staff of the law courts paid fixed salaries that were
not dependent upon the quantity of busll1ess in their court nor upon any fees collected by them on behalf of the court or of the State.
Today, we do not have sinecures within the court system, but the temptation
to staff the clerical offices with incompetent persons for political and family reasons
persists. Also, while secuTity of tenure protects the court clerks from improper political pressures, it also protects incompetence ai1d laziness.
A poorly run clerk's office, whatever be the cause, results in additional delay
ai1d expense in the litigation process. Whatever adversely affects the administration
of justice, such as delay, affects access to the courts and must be guarded against.

3

The abolition of the writs and declarations of the forms of action:
revolution or evolution?

The original procedure of the English courts of Common Law for initiating a lawsuit, an action at Law, was for the plaintiff to obtain a writ invoking the jurisdiction
of the court and to file a declaration that set forth the facts that justified the suit or,
in other words, facts that were the cause of the action.
The forms of action as a system of litigation origll1ated in the royal courts of
England in the twelfth century, a time when the courts of general jurisdiction were
the county courts. The King's courts heard only special cases as a matter of the
King's special favour to a particular plaintiff. Instead of going to the local court, an
aggrieved party could obtain for a fee an original writ issued by the King's Chancery directing the royal court of Common Law to hear the case. The original writ
gave the Common Law Court jmisdiction over the case.
Until the middle of the thirteenth century, the Chancery clerks were free to
draft new writs to authorize new types of litigation or forms of action. However, it
was felt that this was too much discretion to be reposed in the lesser bureaucrats;

Clwrles Viscount F1111slt11we v. Simon Fanshawe, PRO E.112/847 /1441; E.112/850/1598.
See PRO E.159/558I·lliary12 Annae recorda rot. 8.
See G.E. Aylmer, T1ie King's Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-1642, London,
Routledge, 1961, p. 127, 129.
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the power to issue new types of writs is the power to expai1d substantive rights,
which is legislative action. In the mid-thirteenth century, this discretion was taken
away from the Chancery clerks, and they were forbidden to issue new types of writs
or to invent new forms of action.
By the middle of the thirteenth century, the local courts had declined drastically iI1 usefulness and the royal courts of Common Law had become the principal
courts of England, perhaps the only courts fro1n a practical point of view. The plaintiff iI1 order to have an effective remedy iI1 the Comn1on Law Courts, must have
been able to fit his problem into or withiI1 one of the fixed, established original writs
or forms of actions. The generalizations or categories of litigation were called forms
of action because each type of original writ dictated the type of process, the content
of the declaration (the first pleading), the method of proof, and the type of remedy.
The substance of the law itself was considerably influenced, if not determined, by
the system of the forms of action.
Crucial to successful litigation was the plaintiff's initial choice of the correct
form of action. The law of actions contiI1ued to develop after the thirteenth century.
And as the old forms were used for new problems, the law developed countless historical distinctions, subtleties, and 'traps for the unwary'. In the nineteenth century,
it was decided to put new wine into old bottles no more, and the forms of action
were abolished in 1nany Anglo-American jurisdictions.49
The reason that litigation by means of the Common Law forms of action had
survived so long was twofold. The changing needs of society were supplied by the
action of trespass upon the case, which was a general form of action that was expandable. Secondly, the separate legal system of the Equity Courts handled the major problems of law reform until the nineteenth century.
By the end of the fifteenth century, the internal logic of the Common Law
forms of action had developed the idea that all the Common Law was included
within one or another form of action. A proble1n was remedied by a single form of
action and no other; there was no overlapping. It was a single logical system of
remedies, which did not give a plaintiff any choice of forms of action. This strict
theory came to be modified in practice in a few narrow situations. Although ownership of real property could be protected in practice by writs of right or novel disseisin or ejectment, iI1 theory each of these was quite different, beiI1g grounded on
different substantive iI1terests. In 1601, however, it was ruled that a plaintiff could
elect to sue by way of ai1 ~ssize of nuisance or an action on the case. 50 In the next

See generally J.H. Baker, Introduction to Englisl1 Legal 1-listory, London, BuHerworth's, 1990,
p. 63-81; F.W. Maitland, 771e Forms of Action at Commo11 Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1936; F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, I--Iistory of English Law Before tlie Time of Edwnrd
l, volun1c 2, London, Cambridge University Press, S.F.C. Milsom (ed.) 1968, p. 558-573.
Cantrel v. Church (King's Bench 1601), Croke (Elizabeth) 845, 78 English Reports 1072, Noy 37,
74 English Reports 1007.
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year, it was decided in the court of King's Bench, that a promissory obligation for a
sum certain could be enforced either by a writ of debt or a writ of assumpsit. 51
It was enacted in Virginia in 1849 that '[i]n any case in which an action of trespass will lie, there may be maintained an action of trespass on the case'. 52 The purpose of this Statute was to eliminate the problem of having to decide whether a tort
had been committed directly or indirectly. However, the General Assembly, in removing one subtlety from the use of the forms of action, introduced a new one. A
skilled pleader would avoid danger by always suing in case, but inasmuch as the
Legislature did not simply make the two actions interchangeable, the unwary or ill-trained lawyer might sue in trespass and be met with a demurrer on the grounds
that the tort alleged was an indirect one and that case was therefore the correct form
53
of action. In 1897, it was enacted that whenever an action of covenant would lie,
the plaintiff ntight sue in assumpsit as an alternative. 54
These blurrings of the boundaries between the forms of action demonstrate
that the ancient forms of action were categories that the practicing bar found to be
inconvenient. Although a lawyer who was professionally competent could handle
the forms of action and even manipulate them to his client's advantage, they were a
product of an age of relative political and administrative impotence. The forms of
action were archaic in the fifteenth century, the time of the rise of the Courts of Equity, in which pleading was begun by a simple and general subpoena and bill of
complaint.
This system of litigation, which was medieval in origin, was seen as clumsy
and archaic to the nineteenth centmy legal philosophers, and it was abolished by a
single chop from the legislative guillotine in New York in 1848. 55 Writs and declarations were replaced by a simple form which was copied from the practice of the Equity Courts.
The legislative reforms of civil procedure resulted in anguish and provoked
dissent following their enactment. 56 For example, although the Field Code was en-
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Slade v. Morley, 4 Coke Reports 92, 76 English Reports 1074 (King's Bench 1602); J.H. Baker,
'New Light on Slade's Case', Cambridge Lm11 Journal, 29, 1971, p. 51-67, 213-236; J.rI. Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, supra note 49, p. 389-394.
Code of Virginia, chapter 148, § 7, p. 589 (1849); Code of Virginia,§ 2901 (1887); Code of Virginia, § 6086 (1919); Code of Virginia Annotated, § 8-866 (1950); this section was finally deleted from the Code in 1977; see, e.g., New York etc. R.R. v. Kellam, 83 Virginia Reports 851, at
854, 3 Southeastern Reporter 703 (1887).
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W.J. Robertson, 'Address', Virginia State Bar Association Reports, 2, 1889, p. 85-94 (p. 86-87);
Judge Robertson was correct, but in 1916 it was ruled that in an action of trespass, which
should have been the case, the Statute of Jeofails cured the failure lo sue in the proper forn1 of
action, because the declaration alleged sufficient facts for the court to proceed upon the merits: Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Virginia Reports 271, at 279-280, 89 Southeastern Reporter 305 (1916).
Virginia Acts 1897-98, chapter 96, p. 103; Code of Virginia, § 6088 (1919); Code of Virginia
Annotated,§ 8-508 (1950); this Act was repealed by Virginia Acts 1954, chapter 593, p. 765.
'Note', Virginia Law Register, 3, 1898, p. 829.
New York Acts 1848, chapter 379, § 118, p. 521.
].C. Carter, 'Provinces of the Written and Unwritten Law', Virginia State Bar J\ssociatio11 Report,, 2, 1889, p. 95-137 (p.132).
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acted in Florida in 1870, it was repealed three years later. 57 In England in the nineteenth centm·y, the practicing lawyers were very much opposed to the abolition of
58
the writs and the forms of action, as well as to procedural reform in general.
By contrast, this reform of Common Law pleading was accomplished in Virginia painlessly and imperceptibly over a two hundred year period. The first small
step in Virginia was taken in 1705. In that year, an Act was passed by the General
Assembly which allowed public creditors to obtain judgment against sheriffs or
other collectors of public levies upon a sin1ple 'complaint' to the court; the purpose
59
of the Act was to protect the creditor from delay and 'a tedious law suit' .
In 1732, an Act was passed providing for various fees for the secretary of the
colony and the clerks of the various com1ties; these fees were to be collected by the
sheriffs of the counties. This Act further provided that, if a sheriff did not pay over
the fees collected, the secretary or the clerk could go into court ai1d 'upon a motion
[... ]demand judgment' for the sum due. 60 This appears to be the origin of the present day Common Law motion for judgment in Virginia. A similar remedy was
given to the Treasurer of the colony in 1756 61 and to High Sheriffs against their
deputies in 1762. 62
It is to be noted that Common Law pleading by motion for judgment originated as a remedy for public officials against other public officers in relatively sim-

Florida Acts 1873, chapter 1938, p. 15.
Lord Chorley, 'Procedural Reform in England', in A. Reppy (ed.), Dnvid Dudley Field Ce11te11nry Essnys, New York, School of Law, 1949, p. 98-119 (p. 99-100).
Act of October 1705, chapter 9, § 8, 9, W.W. I-Iening, Stntutes nt Lnrge of Virgi11in (= Hening's
Statutes), volume 3, p. 266.
Act of May 'J732, chapler 10, § 8, I{ening's Statutes, volume 4, p. 352; continued in force by
Act of August 1734, chapter 10, § 9, Hening's Statutes, volun1e 4, p. 421, 422; Act of August
1736, chapter 10, § 9, Hening's Statutes, volwne 4, p. 506, 507; Act of November 1738, chapter
10, § 11, Hening's Statutes, volume 5, p. 58; Act of February 1745, chapter 6, § 12, Hening's
Statutes, volume 5, p. 344; Virginia Revised Code, chapter 115, § 13, 14 (1792); Virginia Revised Code, volume 1, chapter 85, § 22-25, p. 320-321 (1819); cf. Code of Virginia, chapter 184,
§ 22 (1849); Code of Virginia§ 3519 (1887); Code of Virginia§ 3499 (1919); Code of Virginia
§ 14-172 (1950); Code of Virginia Ai-1notated § 14.1-175 (Replacement Volume 1978); see generally R.V\I. Millar, 'Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure', Ynie Lnw Jounin/,
38, 1928, p. 193-224 (p. 215-221).
Act of March 1756, chapter 1, § 5, Flening's Statutes, volume 7, p. 12; note also Act of February 1759, chapter 1, §.19, Hening's Statutes, volume 7, p. 263; Act of March 1761, chapter 7,
§ 4, Hening's Statutes, volun1e 7, p. 396; Act of Noven1ber 1769, chapter 12, § 4, Herring's
Statutes, volume 8, p. 346; Act of July 1775, chapter 5, Hening's Statutes, volwne 9, p. 67; Act
of October 1776, chapter 25, Hening's Statutes, volu1ne 9, p. 222; Virginia Revised Code, chapter 84, § 7 (1792).
Act of November 1762, chapter 5, § lL Hening's Stalutes, volume 7, p. 543; Virginia Revised
Code, chapter 80, § 27; chapter 161, § 1, 2 (1792); Virgin_ia Revised Code, volume 1, chapter 78;
§ 32-34 (1819); Code of Virginia, chapter 49, § 40, 41 (1849); Code of Vil'ginia § 909-912 (1887);
Code of Virginia § 2835-2838 (1919); Code of Virginia Annotated § 15-520 through 15-523
(1950); Code of Virginia Aru1otated § 15.1-86 through 15.1-88 (Replacement Volun1e 1981); C.
Robinson, Practice in t/Je Courts of Lnw nnd Equity in Virginia, volwne l, Richn1ond, Shepherd,

1832, p. 616-619.
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pie legal situations. Not only was the pleading in summary form, but so also was
the trial, there being no trial by jury.
The remedy of motion for judgment was also found to be useful in quasi official situations in the eighteenth century. In 1748 private persons were first permitted
to sue by motion on forthcoming bonds, 63 and in 1753 the general public was given
the same remedy against sheriffs for the statutory fine for the failure to return a writ
of execution. 64 It is interesting to note that this last mentioned Statute of 1753 was
the first explicitly to call the pleading 'a motion for judgment'. An appearance bail
or the sheriff where there was no such bail could have summary proceedings
against a defendant for default of the defendant's appearance. 65 Not long after independence, if an attorney received monies on behalf of his client, he could be sued
for them by motion in a similar manner to sheriffs, who had received public monies. 66
This procedure in 1710 was extended to purely private litigation for small
debts; a private person could sue another private person by motion for judgment
where the sum demanded was less than twenty shillings or two hundred pounds of
67
tobacco. Summary procedure for the litigation of small claims has been allowed in
Virginia ever since. 68 In 1786 motion pleading was allowed to sureties against their
principal obligors for exoneration and against their co-sureties for contribution. 69
Act of October 1748, chapter 12, § 14, Hening's Statutes, volume 5, p. 534; Act of November
1769, chapter 3, § 3, Hening's Stahttes, volume 8, p. 327; Virginia Revised Code, chapter 151,
§ 13 (1792); this appears to have been changed by Virginia Revised Code, volume 1, chapter
134, § 16, p. 530 (1819); see generally C. Robinson, Practice, supra note 62, p. 591-602.
Act of November 1753, chapter 1, § 35, Hening's Statutes, volwne 6, p. 344; Act of October
1791, chapter 3, § 5, Hening's Statutes, volume 13, p. 246; Virginia Revised Code, chapter 151,
§ 50, chapter 176, § 8 (1792); Virginia Revised Code, volume 1, chapter 134, § 47, p. 542 (1819);
Code of Virginia, chapter 49, § 29 (1849); Code of Virginia § 901 (1887); Code of Virginia
§ 2826 (1919); Code of Virginia Armotated § 15-516 (1950); Code of Virginia Atmotated § 15.181; C. Robinson, Practice, supra note 62, p. 610-613.
Act of November 1753, chapter 1, § 19, Hening's Statutes, volwne 6, p. 332; Act of October
1777, chapter 17, § 17, Hening's Statutes, volume 9, p. 406; Act of October 1788, chapter 67,
§ 29, Hening's Statutes, volwne 12, p. 742; Virginia Revised Code, chapter 66, § 29, chapter
145, § 4 (1792); Virginia Revised Code, volun1e 1, chapter 116, § 4, 5, p. 461 (1819); Code of
Virginia, chapter 146, § 6 (1849); Code of Virginia § 2893 (1887); Code of Virginia § 5777
(1919); Code of Virginia Annotated § 49-27.
Act of October 1787, chapter 10, § 3, Hening's Statutes, volume 12, p. 473; Virginia Revised
Code, chapter 71, § 7 (1792); Virginia Revised Code, volume 1, chapter 76, § 9, p. 269 (1819);
Code of Virginia, chapter 164, § 10 (1849); Code of Virginia § 3200 (1887); Code of Virginia
§ 3427 (1919); Code of Virginia Annotated§ 54-46.
Act of October 1710, chapter 11, § 7, I-Iening's Statutes, volume 3, p. 508; St.G. Tucker (ed.),
Blackstone's Commentaries, volume 4, Philadelphia, Birch & Small, 1803, Appenctix, note E,
p. 57-58.
Act of October 1748, chapter 7, § 5, Hening's Statutes, volume 5, p. 491; Virginia Revised
Code, chapter 67, § 5, 6 (1792); Virginia Revised Code, volwne 1, chapter 71, § 20, p. 251
(1819); Code of Virginia, chapter 150, § 1-4 (1849); Code of Virginia§ 2939-2942 (1887); Code
of Virginia§ 6015, 6020, 6022 (1919); Code of Virginia Atmotated § 16.1-77, 16.1-79, 16.1-81,
16.1-93.
Act of October 1786, chapter 15, Hening's Stahttes, volume 12, 268-270; Virginia Revised
Code, chapter 145, § 1, 2, chapter 175 (1792); Virginia Revised Code, volume 1, chapter 116,
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At the turn of the nineteenth century, Judge St. George Tucker, who was the
Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary1 took a dim view of
motion
70
pleading, because it defeated the right to a jury trial at Common Law. But the
trend toward simpler pleading continued, and by 1832, when Conway Robinson
published the first volume of his Practice in the Courts of Lnzo nnd Equity in Virginia,
the list of types of cases pleadable by motion for judgment was considerably expaoded. It iocluded, io addition to those already mentioned, the followiog: suits by
a turnpike company against a delioquent shareholder, by the officers of the literary
fund against Treasurers of school commissioners, and by jailors rn1d creditors for jail
fees, etc.7 1 The next major step in the development of motion plead:iJ1g was taken in
the year 1849. One of the mrn1y procedural reforms, which were inaugurated by
John M. Patton and Conway Robinson, the revisors of the Code of 1849, was to al2
low n1otion pleadll1g for all actions to recover money on any conh·act.7 This allowed motions for judgment as an alternative to writs and declarations ll1 debt,
covenant, ai1d assumpsit. The primary significance of this step was that it was the
first provision which allowed motion pleading for general types of problems. Patton
and Robinson recommended this statutory change to the General Assembly because
the earlier use of motions for judgment had been so successful in the limited situations where they were allowed; the revisors predicted that the use of motions would
73
gradually take the place of the traditional modes of pleadiog. Along with the general use of motions for judgment for money based on contractual obligations, the
Code of 1849 provided that such actions could be tried by a jury if either party desired it. 74
The popularity of motion pleading for contract actions was retarded by the
lengthy notice required, sixty days. In 1887 this was changed, and the Statute was
amended to require only fifteen-days notice. 75 The remedy became quite popular
once this delay was removed.76
The general topic of procedural reform was in the air during the last fifteen
years of the nineteenth century in Virginia. At their second annual meeting, which
§ 1, 2 (1819); Code of Virginia, chapter 146, § 6, 8 (1849); Code of Virginia§ 2893 (1887); Code
of Virginia § 5777 (1919); Code of Virginia Aiu1otated § 49-27; C. Robinson, Practice, supra
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note 62, p. 604-607.
St.G. Tucker (ed.), Blackstone's Commentaries, supra note 67, Appendix, note E, p. 56-63.
C. Robinson, Practice, suprn note 62, p. 589-622, and statutes and cases cited therein; J.B. 'Minor, Institutes of Common and Statute Lnw, volume 4, Richmond, Anderson Bros, 1893, p. 13171324; see also I-I.S-i:.G. Tucker, Commentaries on t}ie Laws of Virginia, voluni.c 2, Winchester, The
Republican, 2nd edition 1837, p. 242, where motion pleading is given only a brief paragraph.
Code of Virginia, chapter 167, § 5 (1849); Code of Virginia § 3211 (1887); R.W. Millar, T1iree
American Ve11tures supra note 60, p. ·J93-224 (p. 216-219); see generally R.T. Barton, Practice in
tl1e Courts of Law in Civil Cases, volume 2, 2nd edition, Ridunond, Randolph, 1891, p. 10371

1099.
J.M. Patton and C. Robinson 1 Report of l/Je Revisors oft/le Code of Virginia, Richmond, Shepherd,
1849, p. 832-833; quoted in Wilso11 v. Dnwson, 96 Virginia Reports 687, at 691, 32 Southeastern

,,,

Reporter 461 (1899).
Code of Virginia chapter 167, § 7 (1849); Code of Virginia§ 3213 (1887).
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Code of Virginia§ 3211 (1887).
R.T. Barton, Practice in t/1e Courts of Law, supra note 72, p.1392-1393.
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was in 1889, the Virginia State Bar Association threw itself into the middle of the
codification question. The first presidential address was delivered by William J.
Robertson on this subject. Robertson had been a judge of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals and had served there with distinction during the war and nntil he
was removed by the Reconstruction Government for political reasons. He then practiced law with great success in Charlottesville and was honoured by being elected
the first President of the Bar Association. 77 Robertson in his address advocated the
adoption in Virginia of a code of pleading and practice similar to the Field Code of
New York. Robertson specifically urged the abolition of the forms of action and the
merger of Law and Equity procedure. 78 This address was clea.Tly part of an organized discussion of the codification movement. The annual address at the same meeting was delivered by James C. Carter of New York, a nationally known scholar, who
opposed the idea of general codification. Carter argued against the general codification of private law and criticized in passing the New York Code of Civil Proce79
dure. At the same meeting, the members of the Virginia Bar Association debated
the question of whether Virginia should adopt the Field Code of New York. 80
This was the beginning of a lively debate throughout the State on the subject of
81
law reform. The idea of a wholesale adoption of the .Field Code was quickly
dropped, and the discussion centred on two related proposals: the abolition of the
forms of action and the merger of Law and Equity procedure. In 1891, a special
committee of the Virginja Bar Association recommended that both of these steps be
82
taken. In 1892, the Bar Association approved the recommendations of the committee.83 However, when the committee presented its proposed draft bills to the Bar
Association the next year, the general Code of Pleacling, which included the abolition of the forms of action and the separation of Common Law and Equity procedure, and several miscellaneous proposals were defeated. 84
A.C. Gordon, 'Judge Willian1Joseph Robertson', in W. D. Lewis (ed.), Crent Americm1 Lnwyers,
volume 7, Philadelphia, Winston, 1907-09, p. 129-159.
W.J. Robertson, 'Presidential Address', Virginin Stnle Bnr Associntio11 Reports, 2, 1889, p. 85-95
(p. 90).
J.C. Carter, 'Provinces of the Written m1d Unwritten Law', Virginin Stnte Bnr Associntion Reports, 2, 1889, p. 95-137 (p. ·128, 132).
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Ibidem at p. 32-39. The abolition of the forms of action had been advocated two years earlier in
'Suggested Changes in Civil Procedure in Virginia', Virgi11in Lnw Journnl, 11, 1887, p. 69-70,
and in 'The Code Revision ou1d Law Reform', Virginin Lnw fournnl, 11, 1887, p. 124-125.
See S.S.P. Patteson, 'Law Refotm', Virgi11in Lnw Jounwl, 13, 1889, p. 461-470, 677-687; 'Law Reform', Virginin Law fo11rnnl, 13, 1889, p. 475; S.C. Graham, 'Sacking the Temple', Virginia Law
Jounwl, 13, 1889, p. 809-814; F.H. McGuire, 'Remarks on Pleadings in Virginia', Virginia Law
Journal, 14, 1890, p. 21-25; S.S.P. Patteson, 'Law Reform - A Rejoinder', Virginin Law Journnl,
14, 1890, p. 65-70; 'Remarks of S.S.P. Patteson', Virginia State Bnr Associntion Reports, 4, 1891,
p. 26-35; W.B. Pettit, 'Law Reform - A Rejoinder', Virginia Lnw Journnl, 15, 1891, p. 681-687;
S.S.P. Patteson, 'Law-Reform - A Sur-Rejoinder', Virginia Lnw Journal, 15, 1891, p. 745-750;
W.B. Pettit, 'Law Refo1m - Reply to Sur-Rejoinder', Virginin Law Journal, 16, 1892, p. 1-8; J.R.
Tucker, 'Address', Virginin State Bar Associntion Reports, 5, 1892, p. 85-107.
Virginin Stnte Bnr Association Reports, 4, 1891, p. 26-36, 44-69.
Virginia Stale Bar Associntion Reports, 5, 1892, p. 22-36.
Virginia State Bnr Associntion Reports, 6, 1893, p. 14-62, 72-104.
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Although these efforts towards procedural reforms were not immediately successful, the slow, careful, and deliberate pace of amendment and improvement continued. In 1912 it was enacted that any cause of action sounding in to1t could be
prosecuted by motion for judgment.BS Also in the same year, this remedy was expanded in regards to contract litigation to availability 'to recover money [... ] on any
contract, or to recover damages founded upon any contract, or for the breach
thereof, or to recover any statutory penalty' .86 Four years later, suits for specific personal property or damages in lieu thereof and suits to 'recover damages in any action at law' could be prosecuted by motion for judgment.87
From 1916 until the next revision of the Code, which occurred three years
later, the only major subject of litigation where the alternative mode of pleading by
motion for judgment was not available was the recovery of possession of real property. The use of the action of ejectment remained obligatory, but it was a form of action that had been radically altered by statute in 1849. The more bizarre aspects had
been removed, the fictitious parties of record were replaced by the real parties i11 interest, and a judgment in ejectment was declared to be res judicata. The revised action of ejectment replaced all of the older real actions.8 B
With the revision of the Code in 1919, motion pleading was made generally
available as an alternative to the ancient forms of action pleading; after 1919 any
89
civil Common Law cause of action could be brought by a motion for judgment. (It
is to be kept in mind that motion pleading does not affect the substance of the law
or anyone's rights or obligations. It merely simplifies the procedure or method of
presenting the issues to the court. The inotion for judgn1ent must still set out sufficient matter to state a cause of action.90)
The alternative of motion pleading was judicially encouraged fron1 at least as
early as the tum of the' nineteenth century. Judge Spencer Roane said from the
Bench in 1797: 'I am strongly inclined to view notices with indulgence, seei11g that
they are tl1e acts not of lawyers, but of the parties' .91 Although it was true at the
time, as the century progressed, lawyers themselves used motions for judgment
more and more, but happily the policy of looking favourably upon motion pleading

Virginia Acts 1912, chapter 11, p. 15; this act was superseded and repealed as no longer
needed in 1914: Virginia Acts 1914, chapter 18, p. 28, chapter 123, p. 203.
Virginia Acts 1912, chapter 323, p. 651.
Virginia Acts 1916, chapter 443, p. 760-762, which amended and re-enacted Code of Virginia
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§ 3211 (1887).
Code of Virginia, chapter 135 (1849); Code of Virginia § 2722-2759 (1887); Code of Virginia
§ 5451-5489 (1919); Code of Virginia Annotated§ 8-796 through 8-835 (1950); Code of Virginia
Annotated§ 8.01-131through8.01-165.
Code of Vixginia § 6046 and Revisors' Note (1919); Code of Virginia Annotated§ 8-717 (l 950);
repealed as no longer needed by Virginia Acts 1954, chapter 593, p. 765.
E.g., Securihj Loan & Trust Co. v. Fields, 110 Virginia Reports 827, at 829-830, 67 Southeastern
Reporter 342 (1910); Felvey v. Sltajfer, 186 Virginia Reports 419, at 424, 42 Southeaste1n Reporter, Second Series 860 (1947); M.P. Burks, Pleading anti Practice, Charlottesville, Michie,
1952, p. 290, 295; 13A Micliie's Jurisprudence, 'Motions for Judgment',§ 8-17.
Drew v. Anderson, 5 Virginia Reports (l Call) 51, at 53 (1797); see generally R.W. Millar, T/iree
J\111erica11 Ventures, supra note 60, p. 219-220.
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continued. 92 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1920 grounded this policy
on the more rational basis of preferring matters of substance to matters of form. 93
But still the old but useful myth (or legal fiction) survived. 94
With its simplicity, compared to the writs and declarations of the forms of actions and with the encouragement from the Judiciary, motion pleading quickly supplanted the traditional practice. In 1922, three years after the enactment of the general provisions of the Code of 1919, it was stated that '[t]he remedy by motion[ ... ] is
supplanting the regular forms of action, slowly in some localities and rapidly in
others'. 95
In 1929, the Committee on Judicial Administration of the State of West Virginia published the results of an extensive survey of the use of motion pleading in
Virginia. Their report included the following information about Virginia practice.
'TI1e procedure under the motion for judgn1ent has practically supplanted the common
law pleading in Virginia. Our reports fron1 the clerks of courts show that it is used in
from ninety to ninety-five per cent of the cases. The corrunon law procedure has becon1e so rare as to be an oddity. This has happened in the past few years' .96
'The inotion for judgment procedure has practically supplanted the con1mon law actions in all classes of actions, both in tort and in contract. The only exceptions are
where there is a special statutory form provided, such as ejectment, and in cases of extraordinary ren1edy such as niandamus, prohibition, etc. There is a practically unanimous approval of this method of procedure among both bench and bar'.97

Furthermore, federal procedure was required at this time to conform to the local
State procedure. Not surprisingly, motion pleading spread to the federal District
Courts in Virginia, supplanting the Corrunon Law writs and declarations there
98
also. In 1944 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted that Common Law declarations had 'practically become obsolete'. 99

E.g., Supervisors ofWas/Jington Co. v. Dunn, 68 Virginia Reports (27 Grattan) 608, at 612 (1876);
Cliesnpenke etc. R.R. v. Washington etc. Ry., 99 Virginia Reports 715, at 721, 40 Southeasten1 Reporter 20 (1901). lI. H. Fowler, 'Virginia Notice of Motion Procedure', Virgi11ia Law Review, 24,
1938, p. 711-747.
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Mankin v. Aldridge, 127 Virginia Reports 761, at 767, 105 Southeastern Reporter 459 (1920).
Curtis v. Peebles, 161 Virginia Reports 780, at 783, 172 Southeastern Reporter 257 (1934); Ra11so11e v. Pnnkey, 189 Virginia Reports 200, at 207, 52 Southeastern Reporter, Second Series 97
(1949).

C.H. Morrissett, 'Legislation of 1922 of Special Interest to Lawyers', Virginia Lnw Register,
New Series, 8, 1922, p. 81-119 (p. 97).
T.W. Arnold, J.W. Sin1onton and H.C. Havighurst, 'Report of the Committee on Judicial Adminish"ation', West Virginia Lnw Qunrterly, 36, 1929, p. 1-102 (p. 67-68).
Ibidem at p. 70-71. Note also S.S.P. Patteson, 'Judgn1ent by Notice of Motion in Virginia', fournnl of the American Judicature Society, 13, 1930, p. 167-168.
Cliisl10!111 v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, at 101-102 (1936); Eley v. Camble, 75 Federal Reporter, Second
Series 171, at 173 (4th Circuit 1935).
Shearin v. VEPCO, 182 Virginia Reports 573, at 578, 29 Southeastern Reporter, Second Series
841 (1944).

62

W.H. Bryson

From the safe position of retrospect, it would seem that prudence and caution
in regards to one's clients' interests would dictate the immediate embracing of motion pleading wherever possible. Although some of the older me1nbers of the Bar
being thoroughly familiar with and competent in the old ways were slow to change,
the younger generation did in fact discard them without a second thought.
Having been totally superseded in practice, the forms of action lay dormai1t
for two decades before being abolished in law. Although the writ of replevin had
been taken away in 1823100 and the writs of right, entry, and formed on in 1849,101 it
was not until 1950 that the other Common Law writs were removed as possible alternatives to inotions for judgment.
102
In 1950, pursuant to statutory authority of long standing, the Virginia Supren1e Court promulgated a new set of Rules of Court that require in persona1n ac103
tions at Common Law for money to be sued only by motion for judgment. The
rule was an1ended almost immediately to rectify the oversight of actions to establish
boU11daries, for ejectment, U11lawful detainer, detinue, and declaratory judgments
(when at Common Law), which were then also to be pleaded exclusively by motion
for judgment as required by the Rules of Court. 104 In addition, in order to assure the
validity of the Rules of Court and, inter nlia, to make explicit the abolition of the old
writs and declarations of the forms of action, it was enacted in 1950 that, if a rule of
court should be in conflict with a statute, the rule should prevail. 105 Four years later,
the now superfluous Statute allowing motion pleading in lieu of pleading under a
form of action was repealed and the Ejectment Statute was amended to substitute
the words 'motion for judgment' for 'declaration' throughout. 106 The current Statutes are explicit that pleading is to be done according to the Rules of the Virginia
Supren1e Court.to?
And thus the procedural Common Law writs and declarations were abolished
in Virginia practice, being replaced by the more simple motion for judgment. The
transition was sn1ooth and painless; this is always desirable in law reform, though it
is infrequently attained. The success of this reform was due to its gradual introduction and to its availability as only an alternative at first. When the forms of action
were abolished in 1950, no one noticed or was even aware that an eight-hundredyear old institution had been finally laid to rest.
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Virginia Acts 1822-23, chapter 29, § 9, p. 31.
Code of Virginia, chapter 135, § 38 (1849).
Code of Virginia Annotated § 8-1.1 (1950); Code of Virginia§ 5960 (1919); Code of Virginia,
chapter 161, § 4, p. 625 (1849); from 1916 to 1919 the Statute actually required the Supreme
Court of Appeals to prepare a system of pleading (Virginia Acts 1916, chapter 521, p. 939),
but no such action was taken at that time; see generally A.R. Bowles, Jr., 'The Course of Law
Reforn1 in Virginia', Virginia Law Review, 38, 1952, p. 689-698.
Virginia Rules of Court, Rules 3:1, 3:3(a), 190 Virginia Reports xcix-c (1950).
Virginia Rules of Court, Rule 3:1, 192 Virginia Reports lxxxix (1952).
Virginia Acts 1950, chapter 1, p. 3; Code of Virginia Annotated§ 8-1.2 (Replacement Volun1e
1957). With the recodification of the Civil Procedure Statutes, the forn1er rule was restored,
see Code of Virginia Annotated§ 8.01-3(0).
Virginia Acts 1954, chapter 593, p. 765-766; chapter 333, p. 424-425.
Code of Virginia Annotated§ 8.01-3(A), 8.01-271, 17-116.4.
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Thus, the choice is always between quick, revolutionary, often dictatorial,
change and the general unhappiness that comes from the inevitable dislocations
and the constant danger of counter-revolution on the one side and, on the other
side, slow progress towards the goal by evolutionary piecemeal steps, by trial and
error, and trying again in the light of experience. This latter method is one of
thoughtful change by a large number of persons directly concerned and by broad
consensus.

4

Lawyers' participation in civil procedure reform: planning for the
future

The problems of the procedures of the civil courts are of little concern to the general
public, and this can also be said of most academic lawyers. However, to the practicing lawyers and to the judges, civil procedure is of daily concern. Therefore, the
practicing lawyers and the trial court judges, whose professional lives are governed
by the procedures of the court and who are the most knowledgeable therewith, are
the persons who should guide the reforms and improvements thereof. The Legislature and the appellate courts must rely upon the collective experience of the practitioners and judges of the trial courts when they consider procedural changes.
This section describes several committees and commissions in Virginia which
operate to effectuate the goal of procedural progress. Some of them are official; others are not. The general purpose of the bodies described herein is to consider proposals for civil procedure reform in light of the opinions of lawyers and judges who
have had significant experience in civil litigation and who represent as many different constituencies as possible. Those organizations whose prin1ary purpose is the
self-serving promotion of the financial interests of their members will not be considered.

4.1

The Advisory Committee on Rules of Court

The Judicial Council of Virginia is a statutory body that exists within the judicial
branch of the Govenunent of Virginia.
'The Judicial Council [isJ be composed of fourteen members consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court [of Virginia], one judge of the Court of Appeals [of Virginia],
six circuit court judges, one general district court judge, one juvenile and domestic relations district court judge, two attorneys qualified to practice in the Supreme Court,
and the chairmen of the Committees for Courts of Justice of the Senate and the House
of Delegates. The Council may appoint committees to aid it in the performance of its
duties, and members of such committees need not be inembers of the Cow1cir.ws

One of its committees is the Advisory Committee on Rules of Court. The membership of this Committee is carefully balanced to provide as many different professional points of view as possible within the general area of court procedure at all
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levels of court. There is one judge from each level of court except the Supreme
Court of Virginia. There is a Public Prosecutor and a prominent criminal defence
lawyer. TI1ere are several trial lawyers and a clerk of court. 109 The executive secretary of the Supren1e Court of Virginia is also a member, as are two Professors of
Law who teach Virginia Civil Procedure. These are experienced and successful lawyers with a deep ki1owledge of the practice of law in the various courts.
After careful study of proposals for procedural reforms from whatever source,
this Committee drafts proposed general Rules of Court and, following an opportunity for public con1ment, recommends them or not to the Judicial Council. The
Judicial Council, which is composed of various officials of State Government reconsiders the proposals and recommends them or not to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has statutory authority1 JO to promulgate general
Rules of Court for all of the courts of Virginia.

4.2

The Civil Litigation Section of the Virginia Bar Association

The Virginia Bar Association was formed in 1888 as a voluntary organization of
111
Virginia lawyers. One of its foundiI1g pm·poses was to work for law reform. One
of its sections is the Civil Litigation Section, whose members are trial lawyers who
have a civil, as opposed to criminal, practice. The leadership of the VirgiiUa Bar Association appoints an executive committee, or council, for this Section. The members
of the council are experienced civil litigators, trial judges, and Law Professors, and
they serve for three-year terms. This council receives suggestions for civil procedure
reforn1s from the general membership of the Association, forms sub-committees to
study the meritorious ones, and makes reco1nmendations or not for changes iI1
Rules of Court ai1d for .statutory changes. By not haviI1g a static membership, the
Civil Litigation Section is constantly receiving new ideas and suggestions for improvement in t11e area of law reform. Continuity is maintained by having staggered
terms of membership ai1d by having the Law Professors as permanent members.
4.3

The Boyd-Graves Conference

The Boyd-Graves Conference is a completely idiosyncratic collection of trial lawyers
who are dedicated to law reform in the area of civil procedure. (Because many
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111e clerks of court in Virginia arc elected by the general public; they are in charge of all of the
records of the trial courts. Constitution of Virginia (1971), Article VII, § 4; Code of Virginia
Atmotated § 17.1-208 et seq. Without the clerks of couit and their staff, the courts could not
function at all. Thus n1any problerns of court procedui·e involve court records and their custodian, the clerk of coui·t.
Code of Virginia Annotated§ 8.01-3.
111e Virginia Bar Association is a totally separate organization from the Virginia State Bar,
which is a part of the judicial branch of the State Govenunent. Code of Virginia Annotated
§ 54.1-3910. Since all Virginia lawyers are required to be men1bers of the Virginia State Bar
and are required to inake substantial financial payments for its maintenance, the Virginia
State Bar and its co1mnittees are forbidden to lobby for anything, including law reform.
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members of the Boyd-Graves Conference are also very active members of the Virginia Bar Association, that latter organization voluntarily lends its administrative
staff for arranging accommodations for the annual meeting of the Boyd-Graves
Conference.) This Conference has no corporate existence; it is a group of lawyers
plus some judges and legal academics, who meet once a year to discuss civil procedure reform. Its origin is very telling.
'fhomas V. Monahan, a very successful trial lawyer from Winchester, Virginia,
and a forn1er President of both the Virginia State Bai· and the Virginia Trial Lawyers
Association, was a serious and thoughtful advocate of civil procedure law reform.
However, the Virginia State Bar was forbidden to lobby for anything, and the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association had become a self-interested advocacy group w1der
the control of the plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers. Law reform requires an impartial and disinterested approach because it affects a wide population.
Therefore, in 1978, Monahan invited a group of trial lawyers to n1eet him for a
weekend at The Tides Inn in Irvington, Virginia, to discuss informally various issues of civil procedure and to play some golf on a very nice golf course. The meeting was a great success, and they agreed to return annually. Thus, the group was
known as The Tides Inn Conference. The persons invited were chosen carefully so
that there would be an equal number from the plaintiffs' bar and from the civil defence bar in order to prevent self-interest from prevailing; furthermore, The Tides
Inn Conference made no recommendation unless the consensus was unanimous or
nearly so. Thus, the recommendations represented the agreement of both sides of
the personal injury practitioners' bar. Such a consensus of well-known trial lawyers
had great weight and influence with the Judicial Council and with the General Assembly in the area of civil procedure reform.
Soon after its founding, Monahan increased the size of the invitation list by including a few legislators, trial judges, and Law Professors, and the Conference outgrew the accommodations of The Tides Inn. Now, the Conference has about one
hundred members ai1d meets in different places in Virginia each year. The increased
size has necessitated the institution of an executive committee and ad hoc subcommittees to study various problems and to make recommendations to the annual
general meeting. In 1985, Edward S. Graves, of the Lynchburg Bar and an adjunct
Professor of Virginia procedure, and Professor T. Munford Boyd, Professor emeritus
of Virginia procedure and an active practitioner in Charlottesville, both died. They
had been leading members of The Tides Inn Conference, which by then was no
longer assembled at The Tides Inn, and the group was renamed the Boyd-Graves
Conference in their honour.
The success of the Boyd-Graves Conference in accomplishing law reform has
been the result of several things. The equal membership of both sides of the litigation bar assures that both sides are in agreement with a proposal. The justices of the
Supreme Court of Virginia and leading lawyers in the General Assembly are invited; although few of them ever attend, these persons who have the political power
to make the proposals of the Conference law are given the opportunity to participate.
The rules of the procedure of the Conference are not rigidly fixed and followed
so that a small, well-orgallized clique cannot take over and mallipulate the Confe-
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rence. The rule of unanimity, or near unanimity, ensures that any proposed reform
is very broadly approved by all parties, but a siI1gle dissenter cannot inanipulate or
defeat a general consensus.
The major criticism of the Boyd-Graves Conference is that its agreed-upon
proposals involve only small, highly-technical points of civil procedure. The response to this poi.J.1t, which is true, is that small proceduTal reform can make the system work more smoothly and with fewer resorts to a judge as to interlocutory procedural matters. To reduce the routine costs and to reduce delay in litigation is to
increase access to the courts, as a practical matter, for all members of the general
public. This is a good thing.
These Vil'ginia institutions are too much tied to the specific laws of Vil'ginia to
be closely copied by other jurisdictions in the United States, or England, or the Continental nations. More in1p0Ttantly, the Vil'ginia institutions arose out of and
adapted themselves to the legal culture of Virginia which exists at the present moment. The present political and legal assumptions ai1d expectations did not exist a
hundred years ago nor will they remaiJ.1 for a hundred years. Institutions evolve.
Even so, it is useful to consider them for comparative purposes. The Virginia
system of institutions concerned with pTocedural reform can provide some ideas
that might be instructive for other jurisdictions.
It seems to this writer that the key element for success in procedural reform is
the careful study of the situation to be improved by those actively and closely involved in the situation as well as those who have the power to effectuate ai1y
agreed-upon reform. In addition to having the perspectives of some persons who
are involved on both sides and at each level of procedure, it will be useful to have
an historical perspective. Ai.1 historian of civil procedme can explain why something
was done in a particular way in tl1e past and whether it was good or not and
whether it should be retained in the present or not.

67

